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This thesis focuses on earnings management in REIT IPOs. We attempt to test
whether REIT IPOs involve in the earnings management. If they do, what is the
impact of the earnings management on the post-IPO period performance of the
stocks.
1.2 Motivation
Ritter and Welch (2002) documented that from 1980 to 2001 Initial Public Offerings
(IPOs) industrial firms reported an average 18.8% abnormal initial return at the
end of the first day of trading. However, Ritter (1991), in a separate study, found
that the cumulative adjusted returns (CAR) of a sample of 1526 industrial company
IPOs in 1975–84 fell by 29.13% after 36 months. For REITs, the empirical evidence
is mixed. Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) found that REIT IPOs had a negative
1
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initial trading return of 2.82%, but they under-performed in the 190 trading days
after IPO date. In contrast, Ling and Ryngaert (1997) found that in the period
1991-1994 REIT IPOs had a moderate positive initial return of 3.6%, and out-
perform comparable Seasonal Equity Offering (SEO) REITs in 100 trading days
after IPOs. Besides the two contrasting findings, Buttimer, Hyland, and Sanders
(2005) found that that REIT IPOs had a smaller initial return, but they neither
under- nor out-perform in the following IPO days.
Despite the variations in the returns on initial abnormal returns and after-market
performance of REIT IPO, the early studies implicitly assume that REIT com-
panies’ financial statements, especially earnings, accurately reflect their intrinsic
value.
To maintain their tax-exempt status, REITs invest primary in real estate and
cannot expand their investment freely to other asset classes. They are required to
distribute 90% of their net income to shareholders as dividends. These require-
ments allow REITs to operate in a simple business structure, which could be easily
understood by potential investors. The REIT model is also more transparent,
which allows investors to make better informed investment decisions. With less
free cash flow available, REIT managers are supposedly constrained in the ability
to manipulate cash flows to the detriment of potential investors. Therefore, REITs
are considered to be less susceptible to agency problems compared to after listed
firms in other industries.
However, does the relative transparent of REIT model necessary better insulate
to investors against undesirable agency problems? Even though REITs are more
transparent after they have been listed on the exchanges, they are less known to
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investors before IPO. Rao (1993) reported that there was almost no media coverage
of firms in the year before the IPO. The lack of information forces investors to rely
solely on the firm prospectus, which may contain only the financial statements of
the past 1 to 3 years. Investors may even under-utilize information in financial
statements in their decision making process (Ou and Penman (1989) and Sloan
(1996)).
If we assume that investors are unable to fully understand the extent of earnings
management in either the past or the future earnings that IPO firms engage in,
higher reported earnings can be directly translated into higher offer price. The ac-
crual accounting principle in the financial reporting system does not prevent firms
making earnings management to inflate firm returns prior to IPO.
Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) found that IPO companies are opportunistic. The
quartile of IPO firms that manage their earnings more aggressively, have a three-
year post-IPO stock returns of approximately 20% less than the more conservative
counterparts (Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998)).
However, if firms face diminishing economies of scale, the deteriorated stock
returns in post-IPO periods may be partly caused by scale effects, instead of solely
by earnings management. Therefore, it is necessary to test both the earnings
management and the economies of scale for REIT IPOs.
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1.3 Significance of the Study
Thus far, none of the REIT IPO studies have examined the earnings management
by REITs and their impact on REIT IPOs’ underpricing and after market perfor-
mance. This study attempts to fill the gap by examining REIT underpricing using
the earnings management methodology of Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998).
Employing the earnings management method, we empirically test whether RE-
ITs manage their earning in IPO year like companies in other industries. If REITs
were involved in earnings management, how would their post-listing financial per-
formance be affected?
We find that in IPO year, REITs have high discretionary current accruals, which
they decline in the following years. The magnitude of discretionary current accruals
is higher in the hot market than in the cold market. We find that compared to
non-discretionary accrual, the discretionary components have stronger predictive
power over the change in earnings performance between IPO year and one year
after IPO.
1.4 Hypothesis Development
Studies show that IPO stocks have high abnormal initial returns. Most of them
attribute such abnormal returns to underpricing of these stocks. However, re-
searchers report that earnings are abnormally high in IPO years. There is evidence
to suggest that IPO companies manage their earnings during IPO periods. Indus-
try companies are opportunistic when planning for IPO (Teoh, Wong, and Rao
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(1998)). In this sense, the abnormal initial returns are not fully caused by stock
underpricing. Instead, investors are not informed of firms earnings in the financial
statement.
We develop four testable hypothesises to examine the relationships between earn-
ings management and aftermarket performance of firms.
Hypothesis 1. Are REITs involved in earnings management during IPO periods?
Given the benefits of earnings management, REITs may exploit accrual account-
ing principle to inflate their earnings by taking advantage of their superior infor-
mation. Even though, REITs are generally considered to be more transparent than
other companies, we cannot rule out such possibility.
Hypothesis 2. Do REITs manage their earnings more aggressively in the hot
market?
In the hot market, investors tend to be more enthusiastic about prospects of IPO
companies. There are more sentiment investors in the hot market. Issuing compa-
nies understand the situation and will manage their earnings more aggressively in
the hot market to take advantage of these investors.
Hypothesis 3. Do REITs that manage earnings more aggressively have poorer
earnings performance in the following years?
Earnings management is achieved by borrowing either from the past or the future
earnings, which is not sustainable. Companies aggressively managing their earnings
perform worse than their more conservative counterparts. Teoh, Welch, and Wong
(1998) found that aggressive companies performed poorly in the post-IPO periods.
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Hypothesis 4. Do large REITs have economies of scale benefits?
One of the reasons why companies go public is to reap economies of scale benefits.
Large companies can reduce average costs of their products. They tend to have
more market power compared to smaller ones, and they have more favorable terms
when borrowing money from banks. Companies have more resources to expand
their business when they are listed.
With presence of economies of scale, should a company’s performance deteriorate
after IPO, we can speak with greater confidence that earnings management is the
cause.
1.5 Organization of the Study
The rest of the thesis is organized as follow. Chapter 2 reviews relevant literatures.
In this chapter, we first review two strands of literatures on IPO underpricing — in-
formation asymmetry theories and behavioral theories. Then we review researches
on earnings management during IPO periods for general industrial companies. Af-
ter that, we review literature on economies of scale effects. We also review papers
on IPOs in REIT industry.
Chapter 3 describes various measurements for earnings management. We de-
scribe how Jones (1991) model and Modified Jones models are used to measure the
magnitude of earnings management. Next, we discuss three widely used models for
measuring economies of scale effects — the Translog Model, the Simple Quadratic
Model, and the Quadratic Semi-Log Model.
Chapter 4 presents empirical findings of the study. We test earnings management
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in REIT IPOs. In this part, we also analyse earnings performance, discretionary
current accrual, explanatory power of discretionary current accruals, and potential
sources of earnings management of REIT IPOs. We also discuss empirical results
on the economies of scale using the three measuring models.
Chapter 5 concludes the study by summarizing some of the key findings, limita-




Going public is a major milestone in the life of a company. There are several
interesting issues that draws the attention of industry and academic. The high
initial return of initial public offering (IPO) corporations and the long-term after
market performance are two questions that have puzzled researchers for a long time.
The initial return is defined as the difference of the stock’s IPO offering price and
its first day closing price. High initial return is usually referred to as underpricing.
Underpricing and high abnormal initial return are used interchangeably in the
literature. After market performance is referred to as the stock performance after
IPO.
Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975) found that firms tend to underprice their
stocks in IPOs. According to Ritter and Welch (2002), the extent of abnormal
initial return are considerable high: averaging 18.8% from 1980 to 2001. The sub-
period averages of abnormal returns are estimated at 7.4% from 1980 to 1989;
8
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11.2% from 1990 to 1994; 18.1% from 1995 to 1998; 65% from 1999 to 2000; and
14% in 2001.
Ritter (1991) showed that cumulative adjusted returns (CAR) for 1526 average
matching firms for the period 1975-84 is 29.13% lower than other comparable firms
for the 36 months after the offering date.
Given the significant amount of “money left on the table” (i.e. underpricing)
during IPOs periods, many theories emerge to explain this phenomenon. They fall
into two categories — information asymmetry and behavior theory. Information
asymmetry theories explain high initial return well, but they offer limited expla-
nations on after market under-performance. The behavior theories work better in
explaining the declining after market performance.
The earnings management theory adopts a different approach that focuses on
financial performance of the issuing firms. Most of the theories including infor-
mation asymmetry theories consider high initial return as “leaving money on the
table” by the original sponsoring companies. In contrary, the earnings manage-
ment literature provides evidence that issuing firms take advantage of investors. It
can also explain the after market under-performance well.
In the following part of review, we review literature on the information asym-
metry theories, the behavior theories, and the earnings management theory. After
that, we will review related studies on REIT IPOs.
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2.1.1 Information Asymmetry
Three parties: issuing company, underwriting bank, and investors, are involved in
an equity offering process. One party could have superior information than oth-
ers. The issuing company knows more about its operational and financial status
than investors do. Similarly, investors know better about their demand for stocks
than the issuing companies do. Therefore, we face information asymmetry prob-
lem, when we try to price stocks. Different hypothesises have been independently
proposed by various theories to explain why IPO stock could have seemingly high
abnormal return in the IPO offer day.
Different assumptions on information asymmetry divide the theories into 3 cate-
gories. They are winner’s curse, information revelation, and signaling theory. The
winners’ curse theory is based on the assumption that institutional investors have
superior information than retail investors. The information revelation theory as-
sumes that some investors know more about market demand than issuing firms
and investment banks. The signaling theory says that issuing firms know more
about their own operational performance and financial status, and good compa-
nies want investors to know them. We will review these three theories in details in
the following sections.
Winner’s Curse
Information asymmetry exists not only among the three different parties, but also
among the same party. Institutional investors and retail investors differ in terms
of accessibility to market information. Institutional investors have more resources
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and expertise in studying financial market than retail investors. They are bet-
ter equipped with market intelligence to explore fundamental value of a company.
Institutional investors are usually considered as informed investors, and retail in-
vestors are considered to be uninformed ones.
Informed investors will bid for more shares in a firm with a good economic
fundamental, such that uninformed investors are like to be driven out (at least
partly) in the bidding exercise. At the same time, informed investors are also better
at avoiding buying under-performanced stocks. Retail investors are trapped in an
unfavorable situation which is known as “winner’s curse” by Rock (1986). Given
that uninformed investors are not capable of identifying “lemon” firms, they pay
higher than average market prices for stocks they buy. As a result, the uninformed
investors earn negative returns, and are driven out of market. In reality, this is
not strictly the case. Rock (1986) assumes that informed investors cannot absorb
all shares placed out in the market, including shares offered by good companies.
Therefore, the market is large enough to attract participation of retail investors.
Firms underprice their stocks to ensure that uninformed investors earn at least
non-negative returns, so as to attract them to the market.
However, as the information asymmetry between investors and issuing firms has
not been resolved, free-riders may exist to exploit the system by underpricing stocks
at a smaller margin. Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that the free-rider problem
will not disrupt the issuing exercise. Investment banks will favor stocks underpric-
ing by a right margin in order to secure their business and market share.
The Winner’s curse theory has several implications when applied to analyze
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under-pricing of IPO stocks. If information asymmetry is less severe between in-
formed and uninformed investors, the extent of underprice is smaller. Michaely
and Shaw (1994) indicate that institutional investors largely avoid IPOs of master
limited partnerships (MLPs), because the income received from MLPs is classified
as unrelated business income, which leads to tax disadvantages. Investors partici-
pate in MLPs are mainly retail investors, and information asymmetry among them
is low. The paper shows that the regular IPO group has a mean return of 8.5%,
which is significant different from zero. Whereas, the IPO of MLP groups has a
mean initial-day return of -0.04%, which is not significantly different from zero.
The result is consistent with the winner’s curse theory.
Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that there is positive relation between ex ante
uncertainties and expected underpricing of IPO stocks. They indicate that when
the ex ante uncertainty increases, the winner’s curse problem intensifies. Investors
will have higher probability of losing their money. Thus, a firm will leave more
money on the table (underprice more) to attract uninformed investors. A number of
empirical studies chooses various ex ante uncertainty proxies to test this hypothesis,
which include listed proceeds (Beatty and Ritter (1986)), gross proceeds (Beatty
and Ritter (1986)), firm age (Ritter (1984)), log sales (Ritter (1984)), etc. The
evidence support the winner’s curse theory.
We expect greater underpricing, when IPO firms facing greater ex ante uncer-
tainty. Investment banks (underwriters) will lose market share, if they do not
underprice tacking into account ex ante uncertainty of financial performance of
IPO firms. Dunbar (2000) finds that investment banks will lose market share if
they do not price the IPO properly, i.e. underprice or overprice too much.
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Underpricing is costly. Issuers thus have incentives to narrow the information
gap and reduce underpricing. A reputable underwriter is a positive signal for the
quality of a firm. Carter and Manaster (1990) show that more prestigious invest-
ment banks are associated with less risky IPOs, because the prestigious investment
banks will cautiously choose to issue less risky ones to preserve their reputation.
For investment banks, reputation is the most important asset. There could be
endogenous problems, since only big firms could afford to hire those prestigious
banks. Firm size itself is negatively related to underpricing (Ritter (1984)). In the
early 1990s, the data show that more prestigious underwriters underwrite more
underpriced IPOs. However, Beatty and Ritter (1986) also show that the relation
between reputation of underwriter and underpricing of IPO stocks has changed
since 1980s.
Information Revelation Theories
Rock (1986) assumes that institutional investors are not only better informed than
retail investors, they are also better informed than investment banks and issuing
firms in some aspects. Institutional investors understand the market better, and
know more about market demand and price. Higher offer price is not in their best
interest, while lower price is. Without economic benefits, informed investors are
not likely to reveal positive market signal. Instead, they will disseminate false
negative signal and try to lower the offer price. At the same time, investment
banks’ commission fees and market share are based on their capability of setting
appropriate offer price. They have incentive to explore those informed investors’
information.
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Given that underwriters have discretionary power over IPO share allocation as
claimed Spatt and Srivastava (1991), book building can ensure informed investors
reveal their information. In the book building process, investment banks collect
investors’ bid prices. They allocate more underpriced IPO shares to the most
aggressive bidders, while allocate fewer or none of the shares to the conservative
ones. A large proportion of IPO share is allocated to the informed investors. There
is enough “money on the table” to give them incentives to bid aggressively on the
IPO process. As a result, high abnormal returns for IPOs in the initial days are
expected.
Issuing firms have incentives to leave more money on the table, if informed in-
vestors would reveal more positive information, which help push offer price higher.
Issuing firms benefit from the higher offer price. The more price revisions are made
in the book building process, more money will be left on the table, which is known
as partial adjustment by Benveniste and Spindt (1989)
Informed investors are mostly large institutional investors, who have constraint
dealings with major investment banks. In the framework of repeated game, in-
formed either investors will reveal their information honestly, or be expelled by
major underwriters, which may cause them to lose more in the long-run.
Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) studied 39 equity issues that took place between
1995 and 1997. The issuing companies come from 20 different countries and from
different industries. Bidders come from 60 different countries throughout Europe,
North and South America, Asia, and Australia. All issues are globally place out by
a leading European investment bank with international presence. The 39 equity
issues consist of 23 IPOs and 16 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). They found that
the investment bank awards more shares to bidders who reveal information through
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limit prices than to bidders who submit quantity bids without price limits. Bidders’
revision of their bids can be interpreted as providing new information over time,
and they receive more favorable treatment in share allocation. Bidders with limit
and step bids receive an extra 19 percent and 26 percent IPO shares allocation
respectively. Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) take a step further to explore how
informative is revealed in the order book. They found that information in bids,
which include a limit price by especially large and frequent bidders, have the most
significant effects on the issuing price. The evidence suggests that book building
is an effective way of obtaining informed investors’ information, and the result is
consistent with the results of Benveniste and Spindt (1989).
Signaling Theories
Among the three key parties in the issuing process, informed investors are not the
only party with superior information. Companies have better information on the
present value and risk of the companies concerned. Investors facing greater uncer-
tainty will be hesitated to participate. Issuing firms have incentives to mitigate
the information asymmetry by signaling their quality. Underpricing is one of the
signaling methods. High-quality firms distinguish themselves from the crowd by
underpricing to the extent that low-quality firms cannot afford to mimic. “Leaving
a good taste in investors’ mouths” as argued by Ibbotson (1975) help firms per-
form better in next round of equity offerings – seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).
Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993) found that firms that underpriced IPO
stocks are more likely to go for SEO, and have bigger issuing size for the SEO.
However, the evidence was statistically weak.
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Michaely and Shaw (1994) pointed out that decisions on how much to underprice
and the decision to go fore SEO are not independent. When considering whether
to underprice, the issuing firm will take into account the possibility of re-entering
market for SEOs later. Thus, the decision on the amount offered to the public in
the SEO is endogenous and made simultaneously with the decision of what un-
derpricing signal to be sent to the market during the IPO. Using a simultaneous
equation model they found no evidence to support the signaling theory. The results
indicate that the decision of how much to underprice is not significantly related to
the SEO decision and vice versa.
Signaling theory is not as robust as it is expected to be. Other signaling tools
include prestigious underwriter (Carter and Manaster (1990)) , and issuing smaller
portion of shares.The signaling theory needs empirical evidence to support the
claim that issuing firms do not have to leave so much money on the table.
2.1.2 Behavioral Theories
There are two major behavior theories in IPO underpricing – prospect theory and
investor sentiment theory. The prospect theory is based on the observation of
partial adjustment of IPO offer price. The issuers’ wealth usually increases after
IPO. If issuers are greedy by pushing the offer price too high, the offers may
fail. The issuers are likely to be conservative. They will trade off between loss in
underpricing and gain in stock price jumps.
The second behavioral theory is the investor sentiment theory. From time to
time, there are frenzy investors, who will buy whatever out in the market. These
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sentiment driven investors stories include the Tulip-Bulb Craze in staid old Holland
in the early seventeenth century, the South Sea Bubble in England in eighteenth
century, and the recent high-tech bubble. Given the relatively short history, and
lack of transparency of IPO firms, a wider range of price variation is expected. In-
vestors’ sentiment that creates high abnormal initial returns can be different from
the conventional underpricing.
The following sections give more detailed review on the two behavioral theories.
Prospect theory
Loughran and Ritter (2002) found that even though underpricing is costly, firms
still leave a huge amount of money on the table such that issuers do not get upset.
The prospect theory justifies this observation. It claims that issuers tend to trade
off their losses in leaving money on the table against the gains in aftermarket
share price jump. After IPO, issuer are wealthier than they previously expected,
if stock price soars. They are happy with the result, even though their wealth is
not maximized. If they act too greedy by setting the price too aggressively, they
may fail in the offering.
Loughran and Ritter (2002) use the mean of the price range reported in the
issuing firms’ prospectus as a reference point to measure the satisfaction of issuing
results. The mean price reflects issuers’ initial expectation. The offer price is
usually partially adjusted during the book building exercise. They argue that in
the good state of the world, the offer price is high. Issuers will not push the offer
price higher to avoid the risk of failing the equity offering plan. In contrast, if the
state of market is bad, they are less likely to set the offer price at a high level. They
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will attempt to set a reasonable price, such that they will not suffer significant loss
in the event of a failed offering process.
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2005) empirically test Loughran and Ritter (2002)
prediction on the decision-makers’ choice of underwriters in SEO. They found that
IPO firms are less likely to switch underwriters if they were satisfied (a measure
suggested by the prospect theory) with the IPO performance.
Investor Sentiment
Ritter (1991) found that underpriced stocks perform poorly after IPOs compared
to their peers. Under the traditional framework, underpricing in initial period and
long-term after market underperformance is not correlated. The investor sentiment
theory integrates both of them. Sentiment investors are not regular investors. They
have high expectation on the issuing company’s prospect, and will buy shares
at higher prices. Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2006) showed how IPO firms
optimally respond to such investors. Should investment banks allocate IPO shares
to their regular (institutional) investors or to sentiment investors who arrive in the
market over time to maximize issuer’s benefit? Holding IPO shares in inventory
and restricting the availability of shares, regular investors help to maintain, and
stabilize stock price. On the other hand, still issuing firms can extract as much
surplus from sentiment investors as possible.
Holding inventory is risky. Underpricing is necessary for regular investors. The
expropriation of value from sentiment investors is capitalized into a higher offer
price. When the firm’s true value reveals, share price will plunge and revert to its
intrinsic value.
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One of the implications of Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2006) findings is that
companies issuing IPO in hot market have poor long-term aftermarket perfor-
mance. Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) found that companies can offer
their stocks at a price higher than the intrinsic value. Their cross-sectional re-
gressions showed that “overvalued” IPOs provide high first-day returns, but low
long-run risk-adjusted returns.
Dorn (2003), using German initial public equity offerings data, found that retail
investors would to overpay and end up overpaying for IPOs, especially following
periods of high returns in recent new issues. IPOs bought aggressively by retail
investors in the pre-IPO market or on the day of the IPO showed higher first-day
returns and lower aftermarket returns.
In the context of investor sentiment, initial return of IPO can be overpriced
instead of underpriced.
2.2 Earnings management
Earnings Management is defined by Healy and Wahlen (1999) as:
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in fi-
nancial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial re-
ports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying eco-
nomic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes
that depend on reported accounting numbers.”
This definition divides the earnings management behavior into two categories:
1) the opportunistic exercise of accounting discretion; and 2) the opportunistic
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structuring of real transactions.
This thesis falls into the first category. According to their definition, one of
the motivations of earnings management is to mislead shareholders (or some class
of shareholders) about the intrinsic value of a company. This arises if managers
believe that (at least some) shareholders cannot fully detect and undo earnings
management. It can also occur if managers have superior access to information than
outside shareholders, so that earnings management is unlikely to be transparent
to outsiders.
The incentives to IPO companies are obvious. As one of the most important
ways of raising capital, firms have strong motivation to raise as much as they can
in the IPOs. At the same time, IPO firms are usually less known. Rao (1993)
reported that there is almost no new media coverage of firms in years before going
public. Investors have to rely on the prospectus to evaluate issuing firms’ value and
make investment decision. Given information asymmetries between issuing firms
and investors, and between managers and investment banks, firms are likely to ma-
nipulating their financial status and reporting. The accrual accounting principle
provides them discretionary power in reporting the earnings and a tool to ma-
nipulate financial statements. Investors could also underutilize public information
contained in financial statements (Ou and Penman (1989) and Sloan (1996)). The
IPO prospectus is a complex financial document, hence we cannot expect investors
to fully understand its content. The firm can manage its earnings by using the past
and/or the future earnings. The multiple approach and cash flow approach are the
most widely used methods of IPO pricing. The multiple factors used are based on
comparable firms’ multiples. The higher the reported earnings in the prospectus
the higher is the issuing price. The same effects could be expected for the cash
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flow approach.
There are extensive earnings management studies focusing on specific events,
especially the equity offerings. If firms can manipulate their earnings performance
and distort short-term share prices without being detected, they can raise more
capital at lower average costs.
Various studies tested the hypothesis of whether firms manage their earnings to
inflate their performance in IPOs. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) found that
firms issuing equity (IPO and SEO) prefer to manage earnings upward by acceler-
ating revenue recognition.
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) found that IPO firms’ net income was 7.82%
higher than the industrial median and the discretionary accrual was 4.01% higher
in IPO year. The firms performance deteriorated in following years. For aggressive
firms with higher IPO year abnormal discretionary accruals, their stock returns are
approximately 20% lower than the comparable returns of their more conservative
counterparts.
Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) documented that IPO firms adopt more income-
increasing depreciation policies, when they deviate in the prior performance from
the same industry non-issuers. They provide significantly more for un-collectible
accounts receivable than their matched non-issuers.
2.3 Economies of Scale
The reasons why firms go public are to expand their business and take advantages
of economies of scale. Bigger companies have potential to reduce the costs of pro-
duction. They have more market power in bargaining against their suppliers and
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buyers. The sheer size help them to cut financing costs, since large companies are
consider more secured and less likely to go bankrupt. Big companies have more
resource to improve the operating process, for example, hiring a better manage-
ment team. They tend to have lower average operating cost. Linneman (1997)
proposes five attributes: leadership; long-term capital; low overhead; enhanced
revenues; and successful risk management that support the consolidation of real
estate industry.
There are down side risks, when companies expand. They tend to expand their
scope of business through diversification. When diversified, firms are less likely to
benefit from specialization. The extra complexity in the business creates a bigger
challenge to the management. Small firms typically have less hierarchies. Front
line employees can covey updated information to top managers easier and faster.
There would be less information loss along the process. New decisions and poli-
cies are easier to reach operating staff. Top managers can monitor the operation
more closely. When operating staff have new ideas, these ideas will go up to the
top swiftly. If managers decide to employ these ideas, they can carry out these
measures quickly. Similarly, when operating staff spots problems, these problems
will be solved quicker than that in big companies. Compared to big companies,
small ones are more adaptive to changing business environment. Ratner (2002)
rejected the thesis of Linneman (1997) five years later on the argument that real
estate industry has too many players, and is too dynamic, which needs creativity
to allow meaningful consolidation.
The traditional economic theories assumes a U-shape average cost function for a
firm. A firm will make asset decisions that will move it toward the bottom (optimal
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point) of the U-shape curve. Firms will increase their size until the economies of
scale advantage disappear. As Vogel Jr (1997) puts it, if economies of scale exist,
firms grow bigger than the threshold will suffer dis-economies of scale.
There are two strands of empirical studies. One finds benefits of the economies
of scale, and another shows some drawbacks in the scale economies. We will cover
them respectively.
Applying the translog cost function on data from 1992–1994, Bers and Springer
(1997) found that economies of scale exist for REITs. The authors suggest that
there may be an optimal size for REITs. Bers and Springer (1998), examining
various expense accounts, found economies of scales in General and Administra-
tive (G&A) expenses, Management Fees, Operating Expenses, except for Interest
Expenses . Among them, general and administrative (G&A) expenses have the
largest impact on the total economies of scale, and management fees show the
second largest impact. Capozza and Seguin (1998) partition general and adminis-
trative (G&A) expenses into a non-discretionary “structure” component associated
with the costs of asset and liability management and a discretionary or “style” com-
ponent. They suggest that creating larger and less-levered REITs would result in
enhanced value of REITs.
Using data of 40 public-to-public REIT-mergers and 45 REIT mergers in which
the target firm is privately held from 1994 to 1998, Campbell, Ghosh, and Sirmans
(2001) provide evidence that support economies of scale effects in REITs.
Ambrose and Linneman (2001) offer further evidence when testing Linneman
(1997) hypothesis that scale economies exist due to firm size. Their results show
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that larger firms have higher profit margins, higher rental revenue ratios and lower
implied capitalization rates. Their results also indicate that every billion dollar in-
crease in market capitalization could be translated into a 2.2% reduction in capital
costs.
There are some researches studying the pitfalls of being large. Mueller (1998)
noticed that the earnings per-share growth rate slows down as the number of
outstanding equity shares increases. A mega-cap REIT problem is evidenced by
a dramatic price decline in the first half of 1988. The author claims that it is
easier and safer for the high-quality small-cap, mid-cap, and large-cap REITs to
produce higher per-share earnings growth and overall returns through property
development and acquisition, than for mega-cap REITs to grow through mergers
and public company acquisitions. Mega-cap REITs will have to acquire more
properties to increase profits to the existing assets in their portfolio than its smaller
counterparts. Given sheer size of maga-cap REITs, it is hard to guarantee that
they have enough potential properties to be acquired. It is not easy for mega-cap
REITs to maintain their current return level, should they expand their businesses.
In other words, mega-cap REITs’ return rate will decline, if they merely expand
size without increase earnings performance. The author finds that the FFO per-
share growth rate declines from an increasing asset base under the current REIT
format. As REITs approach the “mega-cap”, there is a point at which additional
growth of REITs lead to decrease in their returns per-share.
Studying 27 EREIT-to-EREIT mergers that have occurred in 1990s, Campbell,
Ghosh, and Sirmans (1998) found negative returns for most acquirers, and compar-
atively low returns for acquired firms in the absence of effective hostile takeovers.
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They suspect that there may be systematic structural problems in the market that
limit the likelihood of sweeping consolidation. Their empirical test showed that
growing big does not necessary benefits REITs. The question of whether or not
significant economies of scale and meaningful differences in managerial ability make
consolidation economically valuable is still in doubt.
Growing big does not create momentum for growth. Being small has its own
problem too. McLntosh, Liang, and Tompkins (1991) confirmed the small-firm
effect within REITs industry. They found that although small REITs earn higher
returns, they were not more risky than large REITs. During 1974 to 1988, smaller
REITs were less risky than the larger ones.
Ambrose, Ehrlich, Hughes, and Wachter (2000) separated NOI growth into com-
ponents attributable to overall market increases in rent and greater management
ability. Using these individual REIT performance and an unmanaged shadow port-
folio, which reflects the REIT’s exposure to various markets, they found that small
REITs’ NOI growth rates exceed their shadow portfolio revenue and operating
economies, while the same results were not observed in large REITs.
2.4 REIT IPOs
Compared to other industrial firms, REITs are usually considered as a unique
category of investment. REITs operate primary in real estate market. They are
required to distribute 90% of their net income to their shareholders. Given the
transparent nature of REITs, investors could better understand the companies’
businesses, and make informed investment decisions. With less free cash flow avail-
able, managers have weaker incentive to manipulate cash flows to be distributed
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to potential investors. REITs are relatively more transplant than other investment
vehicles. The unique characteristics of REITs are expected to shed different light
on the IPO effects of REITs.
Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) first documented abnormal initial returns in REIT
IPOs. With a sample of 87 REIT IPOs, they found a significant negative return of
-2.82% on the first trading day and under-performance in the following 190 trading
days after IPO. The evidence was not consistent with stocks in other industries.
They also found that buyers of REIT IPOs are mainly individual investors. To
justify their findings they claim that: 1) under realistic conditions, there is not
incentive for issuers (or underwriters) to underprice REIT IPOs systematically; 2)
different transaction costs between buying REIT stocks at the offering stage and
aftermarket makes it indifferent to buy the stocks at issuing day or later; 3) most
REIT investors are individuals, such that there is no informed investor. Following
Rock (1986) framework, they showed that it is not necessary to underprice REIT
IPOs. The findings shares some similarity with those of Peavy (1990). Peavy
reported that the mean initial day return of new issues of closed-end mutual funds
was not significantly different from zero. The new funds also showed significant
negative returns in the aftermarket periods. The findings is consistent with the
Winner’s curse theory. Closed-end funds do not have as much uncertainty as
normal stocks, so underpricing is not necessary. REITs issued in the period of
their study share some common feature in the structure with the closed-end funds.
Su, Mark, and Ko (2001) examined 399 industrial IPOs in Hong Kong market,
and find that 56 real estate related IPOs under-priced by 16.21% in the initial
offering days. They provided three explanation for the findings of the abnormally
low return for REIT IPOs: (1) less attention from investors; (2) non-operating
2.4 REIT IPOs 27
firm (or fund-like) structure; (3) the underlying real estate holding. . Because of
Hong Kong’s unique characteristics, they ruled out the first two explanations, and
claimed that the underlying real estate holding alone cannot explain the negative
initial return in U.S REIT IPOs. Their data is on real estate related companies,
instead of REITs.
Ling and Ryngaert (1997) showed different findings from those in Wang, Chan,
and Gau (1992). Analyzing 85 REIT IPOs issued between 1991 and 1994, they
found that in the early 1990s, REIT IPOs have been underpriced on average by
3.6% percent. The extend of underpricing is more moderate, but the sign is con-
sistent with those observed in other industrial IPOs. They also found that REIT
IPOs have moderately out-performed REIT SEOs in the 100 trading days after
issuance. They attributed the shift to greater valuation uncertainty and greater
institutional involvement in recent REIT IPOs. Ross and Klein (1995) indicated
that the post-1990 equity REITs differ from their predecessors in their organi-
zation, business plan and ownership structure. Most of the REITs in Ling and
Ryngaert (1997) study are fully integrated operating companies, rather than pas-
sive conduits for investors’ capital. Their managements usually have substantial
equity positions. In 1990s, the emergence of umbrella partnership REITs (UPRE-
ITs) makes the UPREIT structure more difficult to value. In the period of Ling
and Ryngaert (1997) study, institutional holdings increase to 41.7% from less than
10% in the period of the study of Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992).
Hartzell, Kallberg, and Liu (2005) tested the effect of underlying real estate
market on REIT IPOs. They found significant relationship between REIT IPO
activity and the conditions of the underlying real estate market and the price of
REITs. They found no significant relation between the state of the IPO market and
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the post-IPO operating performance. These findings are confirmed by Buttimer,
Hyland, and Sanders, Buttimer et al. (2005), who found capital demand to be the
major driving force in IPO offerings.
Thus far, none of the REIT IPO studies have examined earnings management by
REITs and their impact on REIT IPO underpricing and after market performance.
This study attempts to fill the gap by examining REIT underpricing effect using
the earnings management method proposed by Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998).
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) excludes REITs in their research and does not
test on economies of scale. No research on REIT IPOs has examined the IPO issues
in earnings management perspective; while, earnings management researches have
not covered REITs. REITs, as an important asset class, needs more extensive as
other assets classes do.
A company typically becomes larger once it is listed in public. Two causes could
lead to the company’s earnings performance deterioration earnings management
and diminishing economies of scale. This thesis focuses on earnings management.
Tests of economies of scale are part of robustness tests. If there is no evidence that
a company has diminishing economies of scale, we can confidently claim that it




3.1 Measurement of Earnings Management
We cannot directly observe earnings management by companies from the financial
statements. Thus appropriate proxies are needed for empirical tests. Various meth-
ods have been proposed to estimate the proxies. McNichols (2000) groups them
into three categories: (a) aggregate accrual models(Healy (1985); DeAngelo (1986);
Jones (1991); Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995); and Kang and Sivaramakrish-
nan (1995)); (b) specific accrual models (McNichols and Wilson (1988); Petroni
(1992); Beaver and Engel (1996) ; Beneish (1997); and Beaver and McNichols
(1998) ; and (c) frequency distribution approach(Burgstahler and Dichev (1997);
Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) and Myers, Myers, and Skinner (2006)).
Among all these, the aggregate accruals model is the most popular method, and
this method is also employed in this study.
The aggregate accrual model decomposes aggregate accrual into discretionary
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and non-discretionary accruals. According to the definition, non-discretionary ac-
crual is the part that does not come under managements’ discretionary power. It is
determined by external factors like macro-economic and industrial conditions. On
the other hand, discretionary components are the part, which can be influenced
by managements’ discretionary power. They can choose accounting methods, de-
termine recognition of timing of accruals and some accounting estimates. Such
discretionary accrual components are used to measure the extent of earnings man-
agement. Higher discretionary accruals could be interpreted as more aggressive in
earnings management by firms.
Among the aggregate accrual models, Jones (1991) and modified Jones model
(Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995)) are the most commonly cited ones. Jones
(1991) model regresses total accruals on changes in revenue and gross value of
property, plant, and equipment (gross PPE). Discretionary accruals are represented
by the regression residuals. Changes in revenue and PPE in the model are used
to control for changes in non-discretionary accruals caused by changing economic
conditions. Jones (1991) argues that revenues are an objective measure of the firms’
operations independent of managers’ manipulations, because revenues are directly
dependent on economic environment of the market. Gross PPE controls for the
portion of total accrual that also related to non-discretionary depreciation expense.
However Jones model has its limitations. If managers distort earnings through
discretionary component of the revenues, the discretionary accruals computed from
this model are likely to be undervalued. It biases down the estimates for the
earnings management.
To address this bias, Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) make a modification
to Jones (1991) model by replacing the changes in revenues in Jones (1991) by the
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change in receivables. They implicitly assume that changes in account receivables
are more prone to earnings management.
Given that managers have more discretionary power in short-term than long-
term accruals (see, Guenther (1994)), we decompose the total accruals into current
and long-term components (follows Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998)). We will focus
on current discretionary current accruals in our analysis.
3.1.1 Earnings Management Measurement Model
Following Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998), we decompose total accrual (TAcc) into
four components: current discretionary accruals (DCAcc); current non-discretionary
accrual (NDCAcc); long-term discretionary accruals (DLAcc), and long-term non-
discretionary accruals (NDLAcc). Total Accrual (TAcc) is defined as:
TAcc ≡ Net Income(1721)− Cash Flow from Operation(308) (3.1)
For REITs, Funds From Operations (FFO) is a better proxy for earnings from
continuous operations compared to Cash Flow from Operations. We make some
adjustments to the total accrual measures.
TAcc ≡ Net Income(172)− Funds From Opeations(FFO2) (3.2)
Following Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998), current accrual is defined as:
1Where the numbers in the brackets denoted the code used in the COMPUSTAT database.
2FFO in the bracket is not code in COMPUSTAT database. This account is not available in
this database.
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CAcc ≡ ∆[Accounts receivables(2) + Inventory(3)
+Other Current Assets(68)]−∆[Accounts Payable(70)
+Tax Payable(71) + Other Current Liabilities(72)] (3.3)
Non-discretionary accruals are the expected accruals from a cross-sectional mod-
ified Jones model, and the discretionary accruals are represented by the residual
term. Consistent with aggregate accrual model by Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998),
the non-discretionary and discretionary components of the total and current ac-
cruals can be derived using the OLS regression estimates. Using the change of
Sales (12) as the right-hand side variable, the expected current accruals for the










j ∈ estimation sample. (3.4)









From Equation (3.4) we obtain the coefficients, aˆ0 and aˆ1, which are used to cal-
culate non-discretionary accrual for IPO firm. Change in trade receivables (∆TR)
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Table 3.1: Definition of Variables Used in the Modified Jones Model
Code Meaning
Cacc Current Accrual
TA Total Asset (6)
∆Sales Change in Sales (12)
NDCAcc Non-discretionary Accrual
DCAcc Discretionary Accrual
∆TR Change in Trade Receivables (151)
aˆ0 Estimated coefficient in equation (3.4)
aˆ1 Estimated coefficient in equation (3.4)
is subtracted from change in sales (∆Sale) in year t for firm i to allow possible
credit sales manipulation by the issuers. Subtracting discretionary accrual compo-
nents in Equation (3.5), we can decompose the discretionary accrual, as it is shown
in Equation (3.6).
Following the same logic as in Jones (1991) model and modified Jones model,
we also estimate cost-based regressions by using change in Costs of Goods Sold
(∆COGS) as an objective measure of firms operations before managers’ manipu-
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where, ∆COGS is change in Cost of Goods Sold (COGS).













(j ∈ estimation sample). (3.10)
The non-discretionary and the discretionary parts of current accrual are calcu-
lated as follows:









DTAcci,t ≡ TAcci, t
TAi,t−1
−NDTAcci,t. (3.12)
For REITs, the PPE data is not available in Compustat. We will not use the
total accrual to capture earnings management. Instead the current accruals will
be used in this study. This allow us to focus on the internal earnings management
effects by firms. The externally driven earnings management as as captured in
the total accruals is not examined in this study. Compared to current accruals,
long-term accruals are harder to manage. Therefore, examining current accruals is
a proper way to test earnings management.
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3.2 Economies of Scale Measures
The inverse of the total asset elasticity on cost variables is commonly used to
measure the economies of scale. The elasticity of cost of total asset is defined as
a percentage change in cost, given one percentage change in total asset value. It







where, C is cost; A is total asset; and e is elasticity of costs of total asset.











If for every percentage increase in total asset, the cost increases by less than one
percent, then economies of scale effect exist. In other words, economies of scale
measure S would have a value greater than one given a particular cost. The higher
the value S, the more significance is the effect of the economies of scale.
To derive economies of scale measure, we need to assume an appropriate function
form for the cost equations. This study analyzes three different function specifi-
cations: 1) translog model; 2) simple quadratic model; and 3) quadratic semi-log
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model. The first one is the most widely employed in the literature.
REITs are income stocks. Regular and stable payments of dividend is a good
factor that attract investors to invest in REITs. Therefore, it is justifiable to use
dividend payments by REIT to test economies of scale for returns. Like the cost
functions, we assume three different function forms for dividend payment equations
— translog, simple quadratic, and quadratic simi-log models. It is desirable to have
that dividends increase faster than growth in size. Positive scale effects are shown
if dividend increases more than one percent as total asset increases by one percent.
Such economies of scale for return indicate that the elasticity of dividend is larger
than one (or S less than one).
3.2.1 Translog Model
Translog model is specified as a quadratic double-log function, which is given as
follows:
ln(C) = ln(α) + β1 ln(A) + β2(ln(A))
2 + γX + ε (3.16)
This model assumes that the cost is an exponential function of asset size. From




= β1 + 2β2 ln(A) (3.17)
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3.2.2 Simple Quadratic Model
For a linear cost function, the simple quadratic model is defined as follows:
C = α + β1A+ β2A
2 + γX + ε (3.18)






= (β1 + 2β2A)(A/C). (3.19)
3.2.3 Quadratic Semi-Log Model
The third model has a semi-log form function as follow:
ln(C) = α + β1A+ β2A
2 + γX + ε (3.20)
The elasticity measure is given as:
eC,A = (A/C)(β1 + 2β2A)e
α+β1A+β2A2 . (3.21)
The actual cost can follow any of the three functions specified above. We will
test economies of scale effects in REITs industry using all these functional forms




228 U.S REITs reported in NAREIT data library form the sample in the study.
Financial data of these individual firms are available from 1962 to 2006 from COM-
PUSTAT. The Funds From Operations (FFO) data are collected from EDGAR
database of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The FFO data are
not available prior to 1993. This limits our study to post-1993 sample periods. For
the period from 1993 to 2006, there are 171 IPOs. The year-to-year numbers of
REIT IPOs are shown in Figure (4.1). The figure shows that there are 3 waves
of REIT IPOs within the periods: 1993-1994, 1997-1998, and 2004-2005, while
witness the most active IPO issuing activities. Following Buttimer, Hyland, and
Sanders (2005), we further define a hot market to include years which have more
than 10 IPOs and those the cold market to include years with less than 10 IPOs.
Based on the statistics, the hot markets include 1993, 1994, 1997, 1998, 2004, and
2005, whereas the cold markets include 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
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and 2006.
The property type and REIT IPOs characteristics are summarised in Table (4.1)
and Table (4.2) respectively. Table (4.1) shows that the equity REITs constitutes
3 quarters of the total REITs, whereas mortgage REITs make up the remaining
share. There is only one hybrid REIT. We divide REIT further into four groups
according to the property type. They are industrial/office, retail, residential, and
other types. Each of these types constitutes about one quarter of the total REIT
share.
Table (4.2) shows some descriptive statistics. In the table we find that mean
of Total Asset of IPO REITs is $1025.86 million and mean of lagged Total As-
set is $448.597 million. The difference between current and lagged Total Asset
indicates that the size of REITs increases dramatically after IPO. The average of
Sales, Net Income, Funds From Operations, Interest Expenses, Operating Expense,
Dividend, and Long-term Debt is $87.5537 million, $5.44044 million, $16.3422 mil-




The multiple method is the most commonly used method in IPO pricing. Given the
importance of earnings performance in IPO pricing, high earnings are likely to be
translated into high offer price. We use two multiple ratios – return on total asset
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Figure 4.1: Number of IPOs
Source: Author, 2008
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Table 4.1: Summary of Property Type
Property Type Equity Hybrid Mortgage Sum Percentage
Mixed 1 0 0 1 0.88%
Office 21 0 0 21 18.58%
Industrial 8 0 0 8 7.08%
Industrial/Office (Sum) 30 0 0 30 26.55%
Shopping Center 13 0 0 13 11.50%
Regional Malls 7 0 0 7 6.19%
Free Stand 1 0 0 1 0.88%
Commercial 0 0 9 9 7.96%
Retail (Sum) 21 0 9 30 26.55%
Apartment 9 0 0 9 7.96%
Manufactured Home 1 0 0 1 0.88%
Home Finance 0 0 18 18 15.93%
Residential (Sum) 10 0 18 28 24.78%
Lodging/Resort 13 0 0 13 11.50%
Diversified 3 0 0 3 2.65%
Health Care 3 0 0 3 2.65%
Hybrid 0 1 0 1 0.88%
Self Storage 3 0 0 3 2.65%
Specialty 2 0 0 2 1.77%
Others (Sum) 24 1 0 25 22.12%
Total 85 1 27 113 100.00%
Percentage 75.22% 0.88% 23.89% 100.00%
*Due to the data availability, only 113 out of 171 REITs’ property type are available.
Source: NAREIT, 2008
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Table 4.2: Characteristics of IPO firms ($ millions)
Characteristics Mean p25 Median p75
Total Asset 1025.86 225.295 496.338 966.012
Lagged Total Asset 448.597 64.638 182.379 444.542
Sales 87.5537 24.5345 50.104 99.0055
Net Income 5.44044 -1.292 4.7835 14.433
Funds From Operations 16.3422 3.964 9.5955 20.294
Interest Expenses 18.95185 1.7075 6.9355 21.216
Operating Expense 41.20163 5.656 19.2295 41.4835
Dividend 13.72318 1.406 5.895 15.568
Long-term Debt 262.0787 6.776 73.623 235.4425
Source: Author, 2008
(ROA), and Funds From Operations (FFO) on total asset in the following analyses.
We employ industrial adjusted terms to identify whether firms are involved in
earnings management.
To be specific, the industrial adjusted return on asset is defined as net income
scaled by total assets of IPO firms minus the median of their non-IPO counterparts
for the year.





where, NI is the net income (172)1, and TA is the total asset (6).
Besides the Net Income, investors and analysts consider Funds From Operations
(FFO) as an important measure of REITs’ operating performance. Funds From
1 The number in parenthesis indicates the account entry appears in Compustat.
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Operations (FFO) is first adopted in 1991 as a supplemental industry-wide stan-
dard measure of REITs operating performance, which addresses some drawbacks
associated with net income measurements under the general accepted accounting
principles (GAAP). The definition has been modified and clarified several times
(in 1995, 1999, and 2002). The latest definition (see, NAREIT (2002)) is given as
follows:
“FUNDS FROM OPERATIONS means net income (computed in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles), excluding
gains (or losses) from sales of property, plus depreciation and amorti-
zation, and after adjustments for unconsolidated partnerships and joint
ventures. Adjustments for unconsolidated partnerships and joint ven-
tures will be calculated to reflect funds from operations on the same
basis. ”
Following the above definition of industrial adjusted return on asset, we define
industrial adjusted operational cash flow on asset as:





Figure (4.2) shows the value of ROA and FFO on total asset. The figure shows
that ROA plunges, whereas, FFO on total asset increases, one year after IPO. In
other words, REITs’ earnings performance decreases after IPO, while operational
performance improves. The results may appear to be counter-intuitive.
When firm’s operational performance improves as indicated by FFO, there should
be corresponding improvement in net income. The Spearman rank order correla-
tion shows that FFO and Net Income are highly positively correlated, with a
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Figure 4.2: Net Income and FFO Scale on Total Asset
Source: Author, 2008
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Table 4.3: Industrial Adjusted Return On Asset (ROA)
Year 0 1 2 3 4
Pooled 0.05% -1.25%** 0.61% -0.16% 0.04%
N 117 114 104 77 72
Excluding 1998 -0.41% -1.35%* 0.68% -0.05% 0.03%
N 110 100 98 74 52
Excluding 1993 0.45% -1.25%* 0.55% -0.16% -0.02%
N 106 113 102 77 71
Hot Market 1.14% -0.89%* -1.29%* -0.28% -0.30%*
N 86 87 75 53 53
Cold Market -2.95%* -1.68% 1.06% -0.09% 0.34%
N 31 27 29 24 19
Equity REITs -0.86% -1.33%** 0.71% -0.30% -0.01%
N 89 90 86 66 60
Non-residential REITs 0.18% -1.09%* 0.79% -0.19% -0.02%
N 109 105 95 71 66
T-test, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Excluding 1993: excluding REITs issued in 1998.
Excluding 1998: excluding REITs issued in 1993.
Hot market: REITs issued in years defined as hot market.
Cold Market: REITs issued in years defined as cold market.
Source: Author, 2008
4.2 Earnings Management 46
Table 4.4: Industrial Adjusted Operational Cash Flow to Total Asset Ratio
Year 0 1 2 3 4
Pooled 0.22% 0.94%** 0.24% 0.18% 0.00%
N 81 81 77 64 60
Excluding 1998 -0.76% 1.11%** 0.05% 0.15% -0.30%
N 77 70 72 63 40
Excluding 1993 0.83% 0.95%** 0.19% 0.18% 0.00%
N 72 80 75 64 60
Hot Market 1.13% 0.57% 0.45% 0.60% -0.11%
N 62 62 62 62 62
Cold Market -2.76%* 1.46%** 0.19% -0.09% 0.13%
N 19 19 19 19 19
Equity REITs 0.53% 1.01%** 0.29% 0.22% 0.07%
N 77 78 74 63 58
Non-residential REITs 0.46% 1.05%** 0.31% 0.24% 0.03%
N 73 73 69 58 54
T-test, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Excluding 1993: excluding REITs issued in 1998.
Excluding 1998: excluding REITs issued in 1993.
Hot market: REITs issued in years defined as hot market.
Cold Market: REITs issued in years defined as cold market.
Source: Author, 2008
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correlation coefficient of 0.6672 and a p− value of 0.0000.
The findings of Shelor and Anderson (1998) show that REITs’ financial perfor-
mance, as measured by return on asset, improved after IPO. However, our pooled
statistics results in Table (4.3) indicate that, industrial adjusted return on total as-
set is positive but not significant in IPO year. One year after IPO, figures become
significantly negative. In Table (4.4), the industrial adjusted FFO to total asset
value ratio has increased significantly one year after IPO. REITs have stronger
operational performance than industrial median one year after IPO, while the re-
turns on asset have performed worse than the industrial median one year after
IPO. Table (4.3) and Table (4.4) show that the results remain unchanged when we
exclude 1993, 1998 data. The year 1 industrial adjusted ROA of equity REIT of
-1.33% is slightly lower than the pooled REITs of -1.25%.
The results of hot market and cold market analyses are interesting. In the hot
market, the mean of industrial adjusted return normalized by asset value is 1.14%
in IPO year, but the effect is not significant. However, the industrial adjusted
return on asset is significantly negative in year 1, 2, and 4. REITs’ earnings per-
formance deteriorates over time after IPO. On the other hand, industrial adjusted
FFO on asset does not have the same deterioration effects over time. In the cold
market, REITs have weaker earnings performance in the IPO year with a negative
and significant 2.95% coefficient for the industrial median. The performance im-
proves in the following years. In comparison, the Industrial adjusted FFO on asset
increases in year 1 after IPO. The results imply that earnings are more likely to be
managed in hot market. We will further test this hypothesis using discretionary
accrual models.
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Figure (4.5) shows that marginal operating performance improves throughout
the periods after IPO. Thus, we can reasonably assume that in year “-1”, firms’
earnings performance is poorer than that of year 0. If this is the case, we cannot
rule out the hypothesis that firms actually inflate their earnings in IPO year, and
make them at least comparable to their peers, which are already out in the market.
Figure 4.3: Total Asset by year
Source: Author, 2008
Following the debut of REIT IPOs, the size of REITs typically increases dramat-
ically over time, as shown in Figure (4.3) and Figure (4.4). One can argue that the
FFO improvement is due to the increase in size instead of operating performance
improvement. Therefore, it is necessary to check whether the size effect does affect
REITs’ operational performance improvement after IPO years. We use marginal
FFO over total asset to separate the size effect, which is defined as follow,
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Figure 4.4: Total Asset by years after IPO
Source: Author, 2008
Marginal change in FFO over change in size ≡ FFOt − FFOt−1
TAt − TAt−1 (4.3)
Figure (4.5) shows that marginal FFO over total asset generally increases after
IPO. In other words, REITs’ operational expenses increase over time after being
listed on the stock market. The results seem to imply that FFO improvement
one year after IPO, as shown in Table (4.4), is partly associated with increases in
operational expenses, and not merely caused by size effect.
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Figure 4.5: Marginal Effect of FFO over years after IPO
Source: Author, 2008
4.2.2 Accrual
The macro-economic and industrial conditions can be volatile over the years.
Therefore, the time effects are controlled in this model using time dummy vari-
ables. In addition, market maturity is also an important factor for industrial
condition. We use average age of REITs in the market to control for the maturity
of REIT effects. Figure (4.6) shows that the average age of REITs in the market
increases over time.
We revise the cross-sectional modified Jones model (Equation (3.4)) as follows:
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Figure 4.6: Yearly Average Age of REITs in the Market
Source: Author, 2008









+ a2(Year) + a3(Market Maturity) + εj,t (4.4)
(4.5)
where, j ∈ estimation sample; CAcc is the Current Accrual ; TA is the Total
Asset ; ∆Sales is the change in Sales to previous year; Year is the Financial Year ;
and the Market Maturity is the average age of REITs listed.
Table 4.5: Modified Jones’ Model
Current Accrual
Dependent Change in Sales Change in COGS
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1/TA−1 0.856*** 1.274*** 0.869*** 0.859*** 1.161*** 0.866***
(0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.18)
∆COGS -0.182*** -0.210*** -0.184***
-0.047 -0.05 -0.046
∆Sales -0.110*** -0.121*** -0.111***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Maturity -0.0106** -0.00137 0.00161*** -0.0114** -0.00144 0.00155***





1996 0.121*** 0.0443 0.126*** 0.0456
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
1997 0.0819* 0.0105 0.0860* 0.0103
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
1998 0.0885** 0.0181 0.0835* 0.00754
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
1999 0.0833* 0.00437 0.0895* 0.00467
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.5 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2000 0.111** 0.0236 0.118** 0.0241
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
2001 0.139** 0.0436 0.149** 0.0469
(0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
2002 0.150** 0.0471 0.160** 0.0493
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
2003 0.139** 0.0318 0.146** 0.0309
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
2004 0.118* 0.0165 0.128** 0.0186
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
2005 0.143** 0.0389 0.155** 0.043
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
2006 0.148** 0.0368 0.158** 0.0382
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
In 93-94 -0.0495** -0.0476**
(0.02) (0.02)
Obs. 898 861 898 898 861 898
R-square 0.11 0.13 0.1 0.06 0.07 0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TA: Total Asset
∆COGS: change in Costs of Goods Sold (COGS)
In 93-94: REITs issued in 1993 and 1994
Source: Author, 2008
Table (4.5) shows the results of regressions that analyze the explanatory rela-
tionship of discretionary accruals and two dependent variables — revenue and cost
side. Column (1) to (3) show the results of current accrual regressed on change
in sales (∆Sales), whereas Column (4) to (6) are regressions on change in cost of
goods sold (∆COGS).
In the regressions on change in sales (∆Sales), we find that except for 1994, the
year dummy for all other periods are significantly different from 1993. When 1993-
1994 data are dropped as in regression (2), none of the year dummy is significant.
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We next use a new dummy (In 93-94 ) to represent 1993 and 1994 effects in model
(3) and the new dummy has a negative but significant coefficient of -0.0495, which
means that hold change in Sales (∆Sales) constant REITs issued during 1993
and 1994 have lower current accruals compared to REITs issued during 1995 and
2006. The non-discretionary current accruals are computed with coefficient from
regression (3).
The results of the regressions on change in costs of goods sold (∆COGS) are
similar. The 1993 and 1994 dummy variables are significantly different from other
years. The results imply that REIT IPOs issued in 1993 and 1994 are systemati-
cally different from REIT IPOs issued during 1995 and 2006. The period is when
the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 (RRA) was initially carried out. The RRA
facilitates the increase of institutional investment in the REIT market. At the
same time, coefficients for year dummy for 1995-2006 are not significantly different
for each other.
Table (4.6) and Table (4.7) summarize results of the two kinds of earnings man-
agement measures – Modified Jones models on changes on sales (∆Sales) and
change in costs of goods sold (∆COGS).
In Table (4.6), we find that discretionary current accrual in IPO year is 4.75%,
which is significant. The number drops by 1.33% one year later. Declines in the
current accrual continue and turn into a negative figure of -1.33% in year 4.
For REIT IPOs issued in hot market, the effects of change in coefficient are more
significant. The first year’s decline from 5.56% to 2.30% is equivalent to a 2.26%
plunge. In the following years the coefficient declines at a faster rate than that
in the pooled data. In contrast, for REIT IPOs issued in the cold market, the
4.2 Earnings Management 55
rate of change is more moderate. The abnormal accrual is slightly positive but
not significant through-out the 4 years The results could be affected by relative
small sample size in the cold market. However, the difference in the discretionary
accrual in year 0 for REITs issued between hot market and cold market is quite
substantial at 5.21%.
For the change in costs of goods sold (∆COGS), the magnitude of earnings
management shares similar patterns as in Table (4.6)
In summary, both accrual measurements show some evidence of earnings man-
agement by REITs in IPO year. In the post-IPO years, discretionary accruals are
not sustainable, and the accruals decline after the IPO year. In the hot market,
REITs manage their earnings more aggressively. The evidence generally supports
Hypothesis 1 that is REITs are involved earnings management during IPO, and
Hypothesis 2 that is REITs manage their earnings more aggressively in the hot
market.
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Table 4.6: Discretionary Current Accrual with Modified Jones Model on Revenue
Year 0 1 2 3 4
Pooled 4.75%** 3.42%*** 0.05% -0.02% -1.33%
N 81 92 86 68 65
Hot Marketa 5.56%** 2.30%** -1.20% -1.30%* -0.52%
N 60 69 62 48 48
Cold Marketb 0.35% 6.78% 3.28% 3.05% -3.60%
N 21 23 24 20 17
With REITs Typec 4.53%* 3.33%** 0.05% -0.31% -1.65%
N 76 85 79 64 61
With Property Typed 3.54%** 1.50% -0.82% -1.10%* -2.62%**
N 81 92 86 68 65
T-test, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a REITs issued in years defined as hot market.
b REITs issued in years defined as cold market.
c Regression with REITs type dummies.
d Regression with property type dummies.
Source: Author, 2008
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Table 4.7: Discretionary Current Accrual with Modified Jones Model on Cost
Year 0 1 2 3 4
Pooled 4.45%** 3.28%** 0.03% 0.05% -1.20%
N 90 103 96 76 71
Hot Marketa 5.42%** 2.21%** -1.29% -1.07% -0.47%
N 65 76 68 52 52
Cold Marketb 0.32% 6.31% 3.22% 2.46% -3.22%
N 25 27 28 24 19
With REITs Typec 5.12%** 3.41%** 1.67% -0.17% -1.42%
N 84 96 90 72 67
With Property Typed 3.70%** 1.74% 0.54% -0.91% -2.26%*
N 90 103 97 76 71
T-test, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a REITs issued in years defined as hot market.
b REITs issued in years defined as cold market.
c Regression with REITs type dummies.
d Regression with property type dummies.
Source: Author, 2008
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Table 4.8: Characteristics of Aggressive and Conservative REITs
DCAccc E/Pd MVe B/Mf ROAg
Conservativea N 45 25 39 39 42
Mean -0.0533 0.057805 566.927 1.655163 0.04027
Median -0.03041 0.046061 321.7747 1.411562 0.033454
Aggressiveb N 45 33 43 43 44
Mean 0.142368 0.050129 306.0873 2.499905 0.05513
Median 0.036306 0.035703 262.845 1.801422 0.025708
All N 90 58 82 82 86
mean 0.044533 0.053438 430.1452 2.098137 0.047873
Median -0.01504 0.041249 296.447 1.621584 0.027402
a REITs within lower half of discretionary accruals
b REITs within upper half of discretionary accruals
c Discretionary current accruals
d Earning price ratio
e Market value
f Total asset over market value
g Net income over total asset
Source: Author, 2008
Depending on the level of discretionary accrual, we divide REIT IPOs into two
groups: aggressive and conservative REIT IPOs. Table (4.8) shows that aggressive
REIT IPOs have lower market value, lower earnings to price ratio (E/P), higher
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return on asset ratio, and higher book to market ratio (B/M).
4.2.3 Regression analyses of Explanatory power of Discre-
tionary Current Accrual
Jones (1991) model, as an empirical model, can mis-classify discretionary and
non-discretionary components. It is difficult to rule out the possibility that the
relationships between discretionary accrual and the control variables may have
been caused by the non-discretionary component. Therefore, we need to further
test the explanatory effects of the discretionary components on the deterioration
of earnings performance in the post-IPO years.
Columns (1) and (3) of Table (4.9) summarize the results on the tests of whether
discretionary accruals computed from the coefficients of current accrual regressions
on change in sales (Equation (3.4)) have predictive power over changes of ROA of
year 1 relative to year 0, and changes of industrial adjusted ROA of year 1 in
relation to year 0. In the table we find that the IPO year abnormal accruals have
significant predictive power. The estimated coefficient for the discretionary current
accrual on sales is significantly negative. If the IPO year abnormal accrual were
high, we expect the earnings performance in year 1 to be worse than the year 0
performance. The expected current accrual does not have such kind of predictive
power. However, the discretionary current accrual on sales has strong predictive
power on change in industrial adjusted ROA. For the non-discretionary current
accrual, the explanatory power is weak.
Columns (2) and (4) shows the empirical results of the tests of alternative mea-
sures of discretionary current accrual on change in COGS (Equation (3.7)). The
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results remain constant, where discretionary accruals have explanatory power,
and non-discretionary accruals do not have the explanatory power on the COGS
changes.
Subramanyam (1996) shows that discretionary and non-discretionary compo-
nents of accruals estimated using Jones (1991) model are positively related to
one-year ahead earnings. Therefore, any induced spurious effects, which is caused
by presence of non-discretionary accrual in the abnormal accrual measure, would
likely bias against our negative correlation between the abnormal accrual and sub-
sequent earnings.
Companies who manage their earnings more aggressively have poor earnings
performance in the following years after IPO. The results support the Hypoth-
esis 3 that REITs that manage earnings more aggressively have poorer earnings
performance in following years after IPO.
Besides the financial performance, we test the relationship of IPO year discre-
tionary accrual level with price change of REITs. We use annual fiscal year closing
price and opening price to capture price changes.
Table (4.10) shows that discretionary current accruals are significant, but non-
discretionary accruals are not significant in predicting the price changes. Coef-
ficients of discretionary accruals on COGS and Sales are negative, which imply
that higher IPO year discretionary accruals could lead to lower stock prices in the
subsequent year.
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Table 4.9: Explanatory Power of Discretionary Current Accrual on Earning Per-
formance Changes
Change in ROA (Year 1
to 0)
Change in industrial
adjusted ROA (Year 1
to 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DCAcc on Sales -0.199*** -0.198***
(0.07) (0.07)
NDCAcc on Sales -0.814 -0.87
(0.54) (0.54)
DCAcc on COGS -0.201*** -0.200***
(0.08) (0.07)
NDCAcc on COGS -0.575 -0.628
(0.57) (0.57)
FFO -0.721*** -0.667*** -0.721*** -0.664***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Constant 0.0397** 0.0365* 0.0428** 0.0393**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 67 66 67 66
R-squared 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.34
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author, 2008
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Table 4.10: Explanatory Power of Discretionary Current Accrual on Price Changes
Price Change
(1) (2)
NDCAcc on COGS 0.394
(0.56)
DCAcc on COGS -0.367**
(0.18)
NDCAcc on Sales 0.502
(0.86)






Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author, 2008
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4.2.4 Potential Sources of Earnings Management
REITs manage their earnings when going public. It will be reasonable to ask the
question of how companies manage their earnings. Due to data and methodology
limitation, we can only test whether certain accounts are possibly manipulated,
instead of testing how a company manages its earnings in a broader term.
Earnings Increases Measures
Specific account in the financial statements is more informative than the accounting
numbers at the aggregate level. McNichols (2000) indicates that by incorporating
institutional knowledge on the accrual behavior, we have less misspecification and
misleading inferences about earnings management.
Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) pointed out that different earnings manage-
ment methods could give different benefits and costs. Firms are tempted some-
times to manage earnings to increase stock price is. Firms issuing equity bear
higher earnings-management costs associated with the effort to accelerate revenue
recognition. They find that accounts receivable are unexpectedly high for equity
offering firms. Using their methodology, we test whether REITs have the same
practices in managing earnings.
We estimate unexpected account receivables (UAR) and unexpected account
payables (UAP) and test how REIT IPOs can manage their earnings. The method
assumes that account receivables should proportionately be related to sales. Whereas,
account payable should proportionately be related to costs of goods sold (COGS).
The unexpected account receivables and payables could be defined as follows,
and all terms are scaled by total asset value:
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UAR ≡




APj,t − (APj,t−1 × COGSj,tCOGSj,t−1 )
TAt−1
(4.7)
where, AR is account receivables; UAR is unexpected account receivables; AP
is account payables; UAP is unexpected account payables; COGS is costs of goods
sold; and TA is total asset.
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Table 4.11: Unexpected Account Receivables
Year 0 1 2 3 4
Pooled 22.18%** -5.16%* -2.47%*** -1.10% -0.92%
N 100 107 102 78 72
Excluding 1998a 23.51%** -5.45% -2.62%*** -0.69% -1.34%
N 94 93 96 75 53
Excluding 1993b 24.65%** -5.21%* -2.46%*** -1.10% 0.17%
N 90 106 100 78 71
Hot Marketc 32.39%*** -3.11% -2.69%*** -0.87% -2.31%
N 74 81 73 54 53
Cold Marketd -6.90% -11.55% -1.90%* -1.64% 2.94%
N 26 26 29 24 19
Equity REITs 1.79%* -0.66% -0.84%** 0.08% -0.21%
N 82 85 85 67 60
Non-residential REITs 23.87%** -5.62% -2.69%*** -1.20%* -1.00%
N 91 98 93 72 67
T-test, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a REITs issued in 1998.
b REITs issued in 1993.
c REITs issued in years defined as hot market.
d REITs issued in years defined as cold market.
Source: Author, 2008
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Table 4.12: Unexpected Account Payables
Year 0 1 2 3 4
Pooled -0.84% -0.71%** 0.08% 0.22%** 0.24%
N 108 113 104 78 73
Excluding 1998a -0.13% -0.63%** 0.12% 0.23%** 0.27%
N 101 98 98 75 53
Excluding 1993b -0.96% -0.71%*** 0.08% 0.22%** 0.24%
N 97 112 102 78 72
Hot Marketc -1.30% -0.66%*** 0.16% 0.35%*** 0.38%
N 80 86 75 54 54
Cold Marketd 0.49% -0.88% -0.13% -0.08% -0.15%
N 28 27 29 24 19
Equity REITs -1.47% -0.78%** 0.00% 0.31%*** 0.16%
N 89 90 87 67 61
Non-residential REITs -0.54% -0.72%*** 0.06% 0.19%* 0.22%
N 99 104 95 72 67
T-test, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a REITs issued in 1998.
b REITs issued in 1993.
c REITs issued in years defined as hot market.
d REITs issued in years defined as cold market.
Source: Author, 2008
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Pooled data in Table (4.11) show that the unexpected account receivable (UAR)
in IPO year is significantly high. In the subsequent years after IPO, the unexpected
account receivable (UAR) is lower than the industrial median. In other words,
the REIT IPOs collect more account receivable than what a normal REIT would
expect to collect in the IPO year. The account receivable, however, cannot keep
up with the industrial level in the subsequent years. This implies that REIT IPOs
collect their future income in advance to inflate their earnings in the IPO year.
They can have better paper earnings performance in IPO year. In Table (4.12),
the unexpected account payable (UAP) is slightly negative, but not significant in
IPO year. One year after IPO, the coefficient becomes significantly negative. In
year 3 after IPO, the coefficient for the unexpected account payable is significantly
positive. Based on the results in Table (4.11) and Table (4.12), we cannot rule out
the possibility that REITs collect more and pay out less during IPO year. The
net effect is that they can have high income, which is translated into higher share
price in the IPO year.
The results are the same, when we control the data for three other scenarios:
excluding 1993 data, excluding 1998 data, and including only equity REITs.
Tables (4.11) and Table (4.12) show different results for analyses in hot market
and cold market. In the hot market, the mean unexpected account receivable
(UAR) is the highest among its counterparts. In the clod market, unexpected
account receivable (UAR) is negative, but not significant in the IPO year. For the
unexpected account payable (UAP), none of the post IPO year results is significant.
The results imply that in the hot market, REIT IPOs are more aggressive in the
receivables collection, whereas, they are more moderate in the cold market.
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Cost Minimization Measures
Minimizing expense by manipulating depreciation is another way to enhance earn-
ings performance of a company. Given the data limitation, we cannot directly
test REITs’ depreciation. According to the definition of FFO in NAREIT (2002),
FFO equals to (as in Equation (4.8)) net income minus gains (or losses) from sales
of property plus depreciation and amortization adjust for unconsolidated partner-
ships and joint ventures. We use the difference between FFO and net income as a
proxy to capture depreciation and amortization.
FFO ≡ Net Income− (Gain/loss from sales of perperty)
+ depreciation and amortization
+ Adjustment for unconsolidated partnerships
and jont ventures (4.8)
Thus,
FFO − Net Income ≡ −(Gain/loss from sales of perperty)
+ depreciation and amortization
+ Adjustment for unconsolidated partnerships
and jont ventures (4.9)
In Figure (4.7), we find both the costs and the marginal costs to increase one year
after IPO. However, these changes are not statistically different from zero. There
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are two possible explanations for the results. First, IPO firms may not choose cost
minimization as a way to manipulate their earnings. Second, the data we use is
noisy, and the proxy may not be able to properly capture depreciation.
However, Table (4.13) shows that change in depreciation from Year 0 to Year
1 is more relevant to discretionary accruals compared to non-discretionary accru-
als. REIT IPOs, which have higher discretionary accrual in Year 0, show higher
increases in their depreciation in Year 1. REIT IPOs manipulate their earnings by
using higher depreciation to inflate their earnings in IPO year.
Figure 4.7: Depreciation proxy by (FFO −NI)
Source: Author, 2008
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Table 4.13: Explanatory Power of Discretionary on Change on Depreciation
(1) (2)
Change in Depreciation
(Year 1 to 0)
Change in industrial
adjusted Depreciation











Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
DCAcc: Discretionary current accruals
NDCAcc: Non-discretionary current accruals
FFO: Funds From Operations
Source: Author, 2008
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4.2.5 Robustness Test
To maintain the tax exempt status, REITs have to limit their business activities
in real estate, but they can invest 25% or less in non-REITs business. One may
argue that earnings management of these companies could come from non-REITs
business, which would allow more room for earnings manipulation to real estate
investments companies.
REIT business models generally do not have active account on Inventory (3) and
Tax Payable (71) in the financial statements. We could identify non-REIT business
in REITs if any of the two accounts have non-zero values. 2 In Table (4.14), we
find that REITs that are not involved in non-REITs businesses have slightly lower
discretionary current accruals than the pooled figures in Table (4.6) and Table
(4.7) (4.75% and 4.87% respectively). However, discretionary current accruals for
pure-REITs share the same patterns as the general REITs. The results may not
reject the fact that pure-REITs exercise some forms of earnings management.
Managing earnings come with some costs. Stricter regulations on accounting
practices limit managers’ ability to manipulate earnings. On July 30, 2002, in
response to a number of major corporate and accounting scandals, like Enron,
Tyco International, Adelphia, Peregrine Systems and WorldCom, the United States
enacted the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of
2002, which is also known as Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Following the Act,
the U.S public companies are under closer watch, and REITs are no exceptions.
Therefore, one may expect that after Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it would be more difficult
2For data limitation, we can only identify companies have non-REITs business in this method.
And we do not have portion data of non-REITs components.
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Table 4.14: Discretionary Current Accrual of Pure-REITs
Year 0 1 2 3 4
Revenue Side Regression 3.39%** 1.87%* -1.55%** -1.12%* -3.05%**
67 76 70 55 53
Cost Side Regression 3.69%** 1.88%* -1.64%** -0.97% -2.93%*
75 86 80 63 59
T-test, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Revenue Side Regression: Modified Jones model on sales
Cost Side Regression: Modified Jones model on costs of good sold (COGS)
Source: Author, 2008
for REITs to manage their earnings.
We attempt to test whether earnings management becomes insignificant after
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We divide our sample into two groups that are REITs
issued before 2002 and after 2002.
Table (4.15) shows that REITs issued before 2002 do not have higher IPO year
discretionary accrual as expected. The average IPO year current discretionary
accruals after 2002 are relevantly higher. The results support the hypothesis that
REITs manage their earnings more aggressively after 2002. In other words, in spite
of stringent regulations imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, earnings management
activities by REITs are not fully eliminated.
Economies of Scale
Table (4.16) summarizes the regression result of the Translog Model. From the
table we find that the coefficients for (ln(Total Asset))2 in the ln(Total Interest
Expense) model are positive but not significant. The same coefficient, however,
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Years After IPO N Average DCAcc N Average DCAcc
0 81 4.75% 90 4.87%
1 92 3.42% 103 3.39%
2 86 0.05% 97 1.39%
3 68 -0.02% 76 0.00%
4 65 -1.33% 71 -1.17%
5 60 -1.82% 67 0.60%
6 64 -0.33% 71 -0.40%
Panel B: Before 2002
0 55 3.16% 57 3.39%
1 61 3.28% 66 3.05%
2 60 -0.13% 67 2.02%
3 58 -1.46% 64 -1.29%
4 53 -1.65% 57 -1.66%
5 41 -2.18% 44 -1.66%
6 38 -1.10% 41 -0.99%
Panel C: After 2002
0 27 6.58% 33 7.04%
1 31 3.68% 37 3.98%
2 26 0.46% 30 -0.03%
3 10 8.35% 12 6.87%
4 12 0.08% 14 0.82%
5 19 -1.05% 23 4.92%
6 26 0.80% 30 0.41%
Source: Author, 2008
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is significantly positive in the ln(Total Operating Expense) model. For the total
dividend model, the estimate is negative, but not significant. These results indi-
cate that when REIT sizes increases, the average interest costs do not fall, but the
average operating expenses increase. The average dividends may also fall when
REIT size increases. The results indicate that reduction in average costs is ex-
pected to be associated with the economies of scale effects. However, the incomes
as measured by dividends could fall corresponding to increasing size effects. There-
fore, the regression results of the Translog models give an indication of economies
of scale on the operating expenses, but the result is insignificant on the interest
expenses. Diminishing economies of scale could also be expected for the dividend.
Table (4.17) summarizes the regression results for the simple quadratic model.
We find that the coefficient for (TotalAsset)2 are significantly positive in the to-
tal interest expense model. The coefficient is negative but not significant in the
total operating expense model. For the total dividends model, the coefficient is
significantly negative. The results indicate that larger REITs do not enjoy benefits
of scale economies in dividend income. In contrary, bigger REITs mean higher
average interest expenses, and possibly higher average operating costs too. The
evidence suggests dis-economies of scale in dividend payments in REITs.
In the third functional model with quadratic semi-log specification, all coeffi-
cients of (TotalAsset)2 are significantly negative as shown in Table (4.18). These
results support possible economies of scale on interest expenses, operating expenses,
and dis-economies of scale on dividends.
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Table 4.16: Translog Model
ln(Int.Exp) ln(Opr.Exp) ln(Dividend)
ln(TotalAsset) 0.791*** 0.522*** 1.113**
(0.16) (0.10) (0.50)
(ln(TotalAsset))2 0.0180 0.0303*** -0.00905
(0.012) (0.0079) (0.037)
Leverage 1.916*** 0.664*** -0.737***
(0.15) (0.20) (0.20)
∆ Total Asset -0.000158*** -0.000104** -0.0000887*
(0.000028) (0.000052) (0.000053)
Aggressive REITs 0.0570* -0.0435 0.00314
(0.029) (0.050) (0.048)
Hybrid REITs 0.141 -1.059*** 0.520
(0.17) (0.12) (0.40)
Mortgage REITs 0.219*** -1.186*** -1.019***
(0.082) (0.17) (0.13)
Constant -3.838*** -0.929*** -3.273*
(0.55) (0.32) (1.74)
Observations 867 877 807
R-squared 0.91 0.78 0.75
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ln(C) = ln(α) + β1 ln(A) + β2(ln(A))2 + γX + ε
Source: Author, 2008
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Table 4.17: Simple Quadratic Model
Int. Exp Opr. Exp Dividend
Leverage 51.28*** 47.06** -28.98***
(6.04) (22.7) (8.05)
∆ Total Asset -0.0298*** -0.0590*** -0.0152***
(0.0026) (0.016) (0.0050)
Aggressive REITs 9.214*** 5.718 -4.628
(1.72) (10.1) (2.87)
Hybride REITs 6.417** -60.37*** 0.140
(2.52) (9.21) (5.02)
Mortgage REITs 16.13*** -123.6*** -51.83***
(6.11) (21.7) (6.89)
Total Asset 0.0334*** 0.0845*** 0.0418***
(0.0012) (0.0064) (0.0023)
(TotalAsset)2 0.000000321*** -0.0000000995 -0.00000103***
(0.00000010) (0.00000036) (0.00000012)
Constant -24.03*** 10.08 21.66***
(2.51) (10.6) (3.40)
Observations 877 877 852
R-squared 0.94 0.72 0.73
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
C = α+ β1A+ β2A2 + γX + ε
Source: Author, 2008
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Table 4.18: Quadratic Semi-Log Model
ln(Int.Exp) ln(Opr.Exp) ln(Dividend)
Leverage 2.301*** 1.133*** -0.400
(0.21) (0.24) (0.28)
∆ Total Asset -0.000239*** -0.000161*** -0.000173***
(0.000040) (0.000055) (0.000059)
Aggressive REITs 0.150*** 0.0437 0.111*
(0.047) (0.063) (0.067)
Hybrid REITs 0.112 -1.470*** 0.425**
(0.22) (0.29) (0.20)
Mortgage REITs -0.0887 -1.426*** -1.265***
(0.15) (0.18) (0.14)
Total Asset 0.000782*** 0.000684*** 0.000736***
(0.000028) (0.000030) (0.000032)
(TotalAsset)2 -0.0000000284*** -0.0000000240*** -0.0000000266***
(2.10e-09) (1.90e-09) (2.35e-09)
Constant 1.097*** 2.850*** 2.679***
(0.12) (0.14) (0.16)
Observations 867 877 807
R-squared 0.72 0.62 0.54
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ln(C) = α+ β1A+ β2A2 + γX + ε
Source: Author, 2008
The average economise of scale (SCE) is calculated by averaging the economies
of scale (SCEi) across individuals. For the cost variables (interest expenses and
operating expenses) economies of scale exist, if SCE exceeds one; whereas on the
dividend, the economies of scale exist if SCE is less than one.
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In Panel A of Table (4.19), we find that for both aggressive and conservative
REITs, the SCE is less than one. For conservative REITs SCE is significantly
higher than that estimated for aggressive REITs. Hence, both REITs show some
forms dis-economies of scale effects, but conservative REITs are less affected by
scale economies.
On the operating expenses, if SCE is higher than one, economies of scale exist
at a given asset level. However, in the earlier results in Table (4.16), we found
that the coefficient of (ln(TotalAsset))2 is significantly positive. When firm size
increases, the SCE is expected to be less than one. Conservative REITs are also
found to have higher SCE than that observed in aggressive REITs.
The SCE for Dividends are larger than one for both aggressive and conservative
REITs. The SCE for the conservative REITs is relatively smaller. Therefore, the
economies of scale effect on returns do not exist.
Panel B gives a different picture. Even though both conservative and aggressive
REITs do not show significant economies of scale, conservative REITs are less cost
effective with respect to size. The scale economies in operating expenses are more
significant in conservative REITs than in aggressive REITs. On the return side,
both aggressive and conservative REITs do not show economies of scale effects.
In the Quadratic semi-log models as shown in Panel C, different results are ob-
served compared to those observed in the previous two panels. Economies of scale
effects are found in both cost measures. Conservative REITs are not better off
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in managing interest expenses, but they show better scale efficiency in operat-
ing expenses. On dividends, both aggressive and conservative REITs do not have
economies of scale effects.
In summary, the economies of scale effects on interest expenses, operating ex-
penses, and dividends vary by the models we employ. To be specific, SCE for
interest expenses is not significantly different from one. The SCE of conservative
REITs is significantly different from that in aggressive REITs.
The SCE on operating expenses indicate that economies of scale exists, except
for aggressive REITs in the simple quadratic model. SCE on operating expenses
for aggressive REITs is not better than that of the conservative REITs.
Conservative REITs have more desirable economies of scale effects on dividends
in the translog model. The results did not rule out the hypothesis that earnings
management through reducing operating expenses could be more significant for
larger REITs, which are found some form of scale efficiency. However, the scale
effects on dividends are not likely to vary by REIT sizes. We could thus argue
that earnings management through income manipulations, if adopted, could be
independent on scale economies effect of REITs. In other words, smaller REITs
could also manipulate income equally effective, if not better that large-cap REIT.
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Table 4.19: Average Economies of Scale Estimate (SCE)
Panel A: Translog Model
ln(Int. Exp) ln(Opr. Exp) ln(Dividend)
(0) Conservative 0.9694853*** 1.083*** 1.009626***
(1) Aggressive 0.9607733*** 1.064363*** 1.014335***
ttest((0)− (1) ≤ 0) 0.0032 0.0041 0.9976
Panel B: Simple Quadratic Model
Int. Exp Opr. Exp Dividend
(0) Conservative 0.9111032*** 1.220661*** 2.061959
(1) Aggressive 1.027855 1.057763 0.985658
ttest((0)− (1) ≤ 0) 0.9999 0.0047 0.1095
Panel C: Quadratic Semi-Log Model
ln(Int. Exp) ln(Opr. Exp) ln(Dividend)
(0) Conservative 6.897153*** 5.067012*** 5.556332
(1) Aggressive 6.572289*** 3.684435*** 1.734869
ttest((0)− (1) ≤ 0) 0.2298 0.0001 0.1313







This thesis examines whether U.S. REITs manage their earnings in IPO year.
It also tests how the effects of abnormal accruals are related to their post-IPO
financial performance. We find that REITs, in our study period from 1993 to
2006, have moderate returns on asset in IPO year. Their performance deteriorated
dramatically one year later. Even though, firm size grows significantly after IPO, it
does not translate into scale economy. The corresponding operational performance
as measured by (FFO) improves after IPO.
We have not identified specific accounts that an IPO company will manipulate;
and how to observe and measure these distortions before investors buy IPO stocks.
This paper’s major contribution is to prove that REITs involve in earnings man-
agement when they go public.
We suggest investors examine the IPO REIT’s prospectus and financial reports
more carefully before the finale investment decisions are made.
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We test four hypotheses in the empirical analysis. The evidence shows that
REITs have abnormally high returns and discretionary accruals during IPO peri-
ods. This does not reject the Hypothesis 1 that REITs are involved in earnings
management during IPO periods.
The abnormal returns and discretionary current accruals are higher in the hot
markets than in the cold markets. This supports the Hypothesis 2 that REITs
manage their earnings more aggressively in the hot market.
The evidence also shows that aggressive REIT IPOs have poor earnings per-
formance compared to conservative REIT IPOs. This supports the Hypothesis 3
that is REITs that manage earnings more aggressively have poorer earnings per-
formance in post-IPO years.
We test the economies of scale effects using 3 different models, and find that
the effects vary depending on models employed. The evidence on Hypothesis 4
that large REITs have economies of scale benefits is mixed. We observe some scale
economies effects on operating expenses, but negative scale economies effects on
dividends.
In addition, we find REITs to have high unexpected account receivables in IPO
year.
The above findings do not support the notion that high initial day return is
associated with “money left on the table” by issuing REIT IPO firms. Instead,
the results suggest that IPO firms are opportunistic. They use their superior
accessibility to information to take advantage of investors.
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The accounting earnings as reported in IPO prospectus are not as reliable as
expected. Investors should carefully analyze the prospectus of the issuing REITs
before making their investment decisions. We also can not assume that prices re-
flect fundamental of companies when using the price data.
5.2 Limitations of the Study
There are some limitations in this study. First, REITs do not have PPE, so we
can not test total discretionary accruals in the study. The tests were restrained to
current discretionary accruals.
Second, we do not have the offering price data. Hence, we are not able to test
the relationship between earnings performance and earnings management on the
first day of IPO trading.
Third, we use three models to measure the economies of scale effects, and the
results are not conclusive. With data constraints, we can not employ more sophis-
ticated models to further test economies of scale. The exclusivity of the model
specifications is not tested in this study.
Fourth, we could not directly test the agency problems in REIT IPOs in this
study. It is difficult to design empirical tests to directly test the relationship
between the transparency of REITs and earnings management. We need more
sophisticated methodology to define the relative transparency of REIT business
model vis-a`-vis other general stocks. The comparison of results on the earnings
management tests between REIT and general stock IPOs could then be made pos-
sible.
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5.3 Future Studies
We can extend the study if we solve some of the obstacles. With initial offer-
ing price, we can test predictive power of earnings management and after market
performance over different control time intervals.
We will also be able to give more conclusive results on economies of scale effects,
if we can test which functional form that best fit for REIT IPOs.
We can test the relation between magnitude of earnings management and pro-
portion of real estate business of REITs, should we have data for the proportion
non-real estate of REITs.
We could also test the endogeneity problems on the scale effects and earnings
management by REIT IPOs. A more sophisticated empirical test, subject to avail-
ability of empirical data, could be designed to separate scale effects from earnings
management. In other words, we need to be able to confidently verify that earnings
management is the only factor that contributes to abnormal first day performance
of REIT IPOs. The changes in after market performance are not related subsequent
scale effects associated with REIT growth in the post-IPO years.
Bibliography
Ambrose, B. W., S. R. Ehrlich, W. T. Hughes, and S. M. Wachter (2000). Reit
economies of scale: Fact or fiction? The Journal of Real Estate Finance and
Economics 20 (2), 211–224.
Ambrose, B. W. and P. Linneman (2001). Reit organizational structure and oper-
ating characteristics. Journal of Real Estate Research 21 (3), 141.
Beatty, R. P. and J. R. Ritter (1986). Investment banking, reputation, and the
underpricing of initial public offerings. Journal of Financial Economics 15 (1-2),
213–232.
Beaver, W. H. and E. E. Engel (1996). Discretionary behavior with respect to
allowances for loan losses and the behavior of security prices. Journal of Ac-
counting and Economics 22 (1-3), 177–206.
Beaver, W. H. and M. F. McNichols (1998). The characteristics and valuation of
85
Bibliography 86
loss reserves of property casualty insurers. Review of Accounting Studies 3 (1),
73–95.
Beneish, M. D. (1997). Detecting gaap violation: implications for assessing earn-
ings management among firms with extreme financial performance. Journal of
Accounting and Public Policy 16 (3), 271–309.
Benveniste, L. M. and P. A. Spindt (1989). How investment bankers determine the
offer price and allocation of new issues. Journal of Financial Economics 24 (2),
343–361.
Bers, M. and T. M. Springer (1997). Economies-of-scale for real estate investment
trusts. Journal of Real Estate Research 14 (3), 275.
Bers, M. and T. M. Springer (1998). Sources of scale economies for reits. Real
Estate Finance (Euromoney Institutional Investor PLC) 14 (4), 47.
Burgstahler, D. and I. Dichev (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings
decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24 (1), 99–126.
Buttimer, R. J., D. C. Hyland, and A. B. Sanders (2005). Reits, ipo waves and
long-run performance. Real Estate Economics 33 (1), 51–87.
Campbell, R. D., C. Ghosh, and C. F. Sirmans (1998). The great reit consoli-
dation: Fact or fancy? Real Estate Finance (Euromoney Institutional Investor
PLC) 15 (2), 45.
Campbell, R. D., C. Ghosh, and C. F. Sirmans (2001). The information content
of method of payment in mergers: Evidence from real estate investment trusts
(reits). Real Estate Economics 29 (3), 361–387.
Bibliography 87
Capozza, D. R. and P. J. Seguin (1998). Managerial style and firm value. Real
Estate Economics 26 (1), 131–150.
Carter, R. and S. Manaster (1990). Initial public offerings and underwriter repu-
tation. The Journal of Finance 45 (4), 1045–1067.
Cornelli, F. and D. Goldreich (2001). Bookbuilding and strategic allocation. The
Journal of Finance 56 (6), 2337–2369.
Cornelli, F. and D. Goldreich (2003). Bookbuilding: How informative is the order
book? The Journal of Finance 58 (4), 1415–1443.
DeAngelo, L. E. (1986). Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes:
A study of management buyouts of public stockholders. The Accounting Re-
view 61 (3), 400–420.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney (1995). Detecting earnings man-
agement. The Accounting Review 70 (2), 193–225.
Degeorge, F., J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser (1999). Earnings management to exceed
thresholds. The Journal of Business 72 (1), 1.
Dorn, D. (2003). Does Sentiment Drive the Retail Demand for IPOs? SSRN.
Dunbar, C. G. (2000). Factors affecting investment bank initial public offering
market share. Journal of Financial Economics 55 (1), 3–41.
Guenther, D. A. (1994). Earnings management in response to corporate tax rate
changes: Evidence from the 1986 tax reform act. The Accounting Review 69 (1),
230–243.
Bibliography 88
Hartzell, J. C., J. G. Kallberg, and C. H. Liu (2005). The role of the underlying
real asset market in reit ipos. Real Estate Economics 33 (1), 27–50.
Healy, P. M. (1985). The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal
of Accounting and Economics 7 (1-3), 85–107.
Healy, P. M. and J. M. Wahlen (1999). A review of the earnings management
literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons 13 (4),
365.
Ibbotson, R. G. (1975). Price performance of common stock new issues. Journal
of Financial Economics 2 (3), 235–272.
Jegadeesh, N., M. Weinstein, and I. Welch (1993). An empirical investigation of ipo
returns and subsequent equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics 34 (2),
153–175.
Jones, J. J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations.
Journal of Accounting Research 29 (2), 193–228.
Kang, S.-H. and K. Sivaramakrishnan (1995). Issues in testing earnings man-
agement and an instrumental variable approach. Journal of Accounting Re-
search 33 (2), 353–367.
Ling, D. C. and M. Ryngaert (1997). Valuation uncertainty, institutional involve-
ment, and the underpricing of ipos: The case of reits. Journal of Financial
Economics 43 (3), 433–456.
Linneman, P. (1997). The forces changing the real estate industry forever. Wharton
Real Estate Review 1 (1).
Bibliography 89
Ljungqvist, A., V. Nanda, and R. Singh (2006). Hot markets, investor sentiment,
and ipo pricing. Journal of Business 79 (4), 1667–1702.
Ljungqvist, A. L. E. X. and W. J. Wilhelm (2005). Does prospect theory explain
ipo market behavior? The Journal of Finance 60 (4), 1759–1790.
Logue, D. E. (1973). Premia on unseasoned equity issues. Journal of Economics
and Business 25, 133–141.
Loughran, T. and J. R. Ritter (2002). Why don’t issuers get upset about leaving
money on the table in ipos? Review of Financial Studies 15 (2), 413–444.
Marquardt, C. A. and C. I. Wiedman (2004). How are earnings managed? an
examination of specific accruals*. Contemporary Accounting Research 21 (2),
461.
McLntosh, W., Y. Liang, and D. L. Tompkins (1991). An examination of the
small-firm effect within the reit industry. Journal of Real Estate Research 6 (1),
9.
McNichols, M. and G. P. Wilson (1988). Evidence of earnings management from
the provision for bad debts. Journal of Accounting Research 26, 1–31.
McNichols, M. F. (2000). Research design issues in earnings management studies.
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 19 (4-5), 313–345.
Michaely, R. and W. H. Shaw (1994). The pricing of initial public offerings: Tests of
adverse-selection and signaling theories. The Review of Financial Studies 7 (2),
279–319.
Bibliography 90
Mueller, G. R. (1998). Reit size and earnings growth: Is bigger better, or a new
challenge? Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management 4 (2), 149.
Myers, J. N., L. A. Myers, and D. J. Skinner (2006). Earnings momentum and
earnings management.
NAREIT (2002). White paper on funds from operations.
Ou, J. A. and S. H. Penman (1989). Accounting measurement, price-earnings
ratio, and the information content of security prices. Journal of Accounting
Research 27, 111–144.
Peavy, J. W. I. (1990). Returns on initial public offerings of closed-end funds. The
Review of Financial Studies 3 (4), 695–708.
Petroni, K. R. (1992). Optimistic reporting in the property- casualty insurance
industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics 15 (4), 485–508.
Purnanandam, A. K. and B. Swaminathan (2004). Are ipos really underpriced?
Rev. Financ. Stud. 17 (3), 811–848.
Rao, G. (1993). The relation between stock returns and earnings: A study of
newly-public firms. Working Paper, Kidder Peabody and Co.
Ratner, A. B. (2002). The forces not changing real estate forever. Zell/Lurie Center
Working Papers.
Ritter, J. R. (1984). The ”hot issue” market of 1980. The Journal of Busi-
ness 57 (2), 215–240.
Bibliography 91
Ritter, J. R. (1991). The long-run performance of initial public offerings. The
Journal of Finance 46 (1), 3–27.
Ritter, J. R. and I. Welch (2002). A review of ipo activity, pricing, and allocations.
The Journal of Finance 57 (4), 1795–1828.
Rock, K. (1986). Why new issues are underpriced. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 15 (1-2), 187–212.
Ross, S. and R. Klein (1995). Real estate investment trusts for the 1990s. Real
Estate Finance Journal (Summer), 37–44.
Shelor, R. M. and D. C. Anderson (1998). The financial performance of reits
following initial public offerings. Journal of Real Estate Research 16 (3), 375.
Sloan, R. G. (1996). Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash
flows about future earnings? The Accounting Review 71 (3), 289–315.
Spatt, C. and S. Srivastava (1991). Preplay communication, participation restric-
tions, and efficiency in initial public offerings. The Review of Financial Stud-
ies 4 (4), 709–726.
Su, H. C., H. S. Mark, and W. Ko (2001). Are real estate ipos a different species?
evidence from hong kong ipos. The Journal of Real Estate Research 21 (3), 201.
Subramanyam, K. R. (1996). The pricing of discretionary accruals. Journal of
Accounting and Economics 22 (1-3), 249–281.
Teoh, S. H., I. Welch, and T. J. Wong (1998). Earnings management and the long-
run market performance of initial public offerings. The Journal of Finance 53 (6),
1935–1974.
Bibliography 92
Teoh, S. H., T. J. Wong, and G. R. Rao (1998). Are accruals during initial public
offerings opportunistic? Review of Accounting Studies 3 (1), 175–208.
Vogel Jr, J. H. (1997). Why the new conventional wisdom about reits is wrong.
Real Estate Finance (Euromoney Institutional Investor PLC) 14 (2), 7.
Wang, K., S. H. Chan, and G. W. Gau (1992). Initial public offerings of equity secu-
rities : Anomalous evidence using reits. Journal of Financial Economics 31 (3),
381–410.
Name: Shen Huaisheng
Degree: Master of Science
Department: Real Estate
Thesis Title: Earnings Management in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
of U.S. REITs
Abstract
Hartzell et al (2005)1 indicate that demand and supply of properties are major
forces driving REIT market cycles. Firms raise capital in accordance to their needs.
However, firms tend to raise more than needed in any fund raising exercise. Do
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) inflate their earning in their initial public
offerings (IPOs)? Based on financial data of more than 200 REITs, this thesis tests
the hypothesis of whether REITs distort their accounting earning performance to
support their equity fund raising exercises. The study shows that REITs have
excessively high discretionary accruals in IPO year, but these accruals decline in
the following years. The change in ROA can be efficiently predicted by the IPO year
abnormal accruals. In the hot market, earnings management is more aggressive.
REIT IPOs in the hot markets are more opportunistic, they are more likely to
exploit the earnings management in their IPO exercises.
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